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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CURTIS W. COLLINS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Priority 10 
Court of Appeals #: 20010371-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
I. ARGUMENT 
The Defendant submits this reply brief in response to three (3) contentions asserted in 
the Appellee's Brief. 
First, that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was properly before the court 
to be considered by the lower court in determining the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Second, that the Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his claim that "Utah Code 
Annotated 62A-12-232(1) (a) (i) was not complied with when the Defendant was committed into 
the custody of the mental health authority" [Bi.Aplt. 15]; and therefore appellant review of its 
merits is precluded. 
Third, that the Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his claim that "the lower court's 
Memorandum Decision advanced new theories of which the Defendant neither had notice nor 
91070 05\Bneffiepl>wpd 3 
an opportunity to address, therefore, the Defendant's due process rights were denied." [Br.Aplt. 
14] and therefore appellant review of its merits is precluded. 
1. Preliminary Hearing Evidence. The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing of this 
case was not properly before the court to be considered when determining the Motion 
to Suppress. The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing is not part of the record 
to be considered on this appeal. 
The Appellee's assertions that, 
"Because the trial judge conducted the preliminary hearing and was 
familiar with the facts, the trial judge and counsel agreed that an 
evidentiary hearing was not necessary to resohe the motion to suppress 
(R. 27-28; R. 69: 32-34). It was decided that 'if there's going to be an issue 
on the testimony, it would be a lot easier if [counsel] just get the videotape 
and either of you make a transcript of that little portion. (R.69: 33)'" 
[Aple.Brf. 3] 
The portion of the preliminary hearing transcript cited in support of the Appellee's 
assertion is attached hereto as Addendum 1. The transcript verifies that the Appellee's 
assertion is unfounded. The Defendant clearly did not agree that the preliminary hearing 
evidence could be considered by the judge at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress. If 
there was any agreement between the judge and counsel it certainly required that a 
transcript of the preliminary hearing be available at the motion hearing. The transcript 
of the preliminary hearing was not prepared and filed until after this appeal was filed on 
April 24,2001. The preliminary hearing transcript was certified by the court reporter on 
July 11, 2001 and filed in the court on July 17, 2001. 
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The only facts that were before the court to be considered were the facts stated 
in the Defendant's Memorandum and the two (2) police reports attached thereto. [R. 40, 
41, 44-46, 55, 70 p.2,1. 20-22] The State reaffirmed the relevant facts before the lower 
court in its Response to the Defendant's Suppression Motion, "the State accepts the facts 
as stated in the defendant's brief." [R. 55] The facts as presented by the Defendant were 
undisputed and consequendy the preliminary hearing transcript was not requested at that 
time. 
Although there is no indication that the lower court judge relied to any extent on 
the preliminary hearing evidence, the Appellee's Brief heavily relies upon the preliminary 
hearing transcript in its statement of facts and consequendy misstates many of the facts 
and incorrecdy claims that many of the facts were before the lower court to be 
considered at the motion hearing when they were not. One particularly egregious and 
misleading example is the factual assertion at the bottom of page 5 of the Appellee's 
Brief "When the defendant arrived at the hospital, the hospital staff requested Yeates to 
assist them in undressing defendant (R.69: 14-15)." This was not presented in the 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress or either of the police 
reports attached thereto and was not before the lower court to be considered in 
determining the Motion to Suppress. 
2. Failure to Preserve Issues for Appeal. The Defendant's claim that "Utah Code 
Annotated 62A-12-232(l)(a)(i) was not complied with when the Defendant was 
committed into the custody of the local mental health authority" and that "the lower 
91070.05\BnefReply.wpd 5 
court's Memorandum Decision advanced new theories of which the Defendant neither 
had notice nor an opportunity to address therefore the Defendant's due process rights 
were denied" are properly before the Court for appellate review. Both issues are 
essentially the same and will be addressed together in this brief. 
At the time the lower court announced that it intended to take the motion under 
advisement and to do some independent research, the Defendant had no notice that the 
lower court would go beyond the arguments made by the prosecution and the Defendant 
at the hearing. The Defendant had no notice that the lower court would imply a warrant 
exception under the mental health statute to support its decision. The Defendant did not 
have notice that the lower court would base its decision on the emergency circumstances 
exception. The emergency circumstances exception was not discussed or argued by the 
prosecution. The Defendant was not in a position to object to the lower count's desire 
to take the motion under advisement and do independent research. The ruling was made 
without giving the Defendant the opportunity to respond. The Defendant's counsel did 
give the lower court notice during the motion hearing that he desired to respond to any 
authorities that went beyond what the prosecution had already presented. Counsel stated 
to the lower court, 
"If in fact it's not justified incident to an arrest, we need to identify, if 
we're going to allow it in, a specific exception, one of those well 
delineated exceptions. I challenge anybody to show me any case law th_at 
shows me any of those well delineated exceptions here. It just doesn't fit 
any of them that I know. 
Now, I apologi2e to say I challenge. Maybe you'll think of one riglit 
quickly. If you do, fine. I would really like to have a chance to respond 
to it, but I don't see any. Thank you." [R. 70: p. 8,1. 12-21, Addendum 2] 
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In the event that the issues, or either of them, were not properly preserved for 
appeal their merits should be considered on appeal either based on the "exceptional 
circumstances" exception and/or the "plain error" exception. State vs. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, 10 P.3d 346; Monson vs. Carver, 1999 UT, 928 P.2d 1017; State vs. Eldredge, 1989 
UT, 773 P.2d 29; State vs. Verde, 1989 UT, 770 P.2d 116. 
The fact that the lower court rejected all of the prosecution's arguments advanced 
at the motion hearing and then did its own independent research and based its decisions 
on two theories not presented at the motion hearing is certainly an "exceptional 
circumstance". At the very minimum the lower court, prior to issuing its decision, 
should have informed the Defendant of the ruling and allowed the Defendant to submit 
a reply. This was a procedural irregularity that adversely impacted the Defendant's due 
process rights. 
In regard to plain error, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in State vs. Holgate that, 
"The plain error exception enables the appellate court to 'balance the need 
for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.' State vs. Verde 
supra. cAt bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit us to avoid 
injustice.' State vs. Eldredge supra. To demonstrate plain error, a defendant 
must establish that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined." Id. at ^13 
The lower court committed "plain error" when it found that the "Certificate for 
Commitment to Local Mental Health Authority" met the requirements of the Mental 
Health Act and authorized the Defendant to be committed to the local me ntal health 
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authority. \K. 43] After reviewing Utah Code Annotated 62-12-232, it should have been 
obvious to the lower court that the statute was only partially complied with. The plain 
error is harmful to the Defendant because the lower court used compliance with the 
statute to deny the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood the lower court would have found in favor of the Defendant. The 
Appellant's Brief sets out the requirements and the procedures of the statute. [Aplt.Brf. 
Addendum 3] The Defendant was not properly committed into the custody of the local 
mental health authority. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in the Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Suppress is undisputed and was properly before the lower court. The preliminary hearing 
evidence was not considered by the lower court. The evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing is not part of the record to be considered on appeal. 
The Defendant's claims of non-compliance with Utah Code Annotated 62A-12-
232(1) (a) (i), Temporary Committment and violation of his due process rights were preserved for 
appeal and are properly before the Court to be considered for appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of April, 2002. 
102 South 100 West 
P. O. Box 461 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
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ADDENDUM 1 
1 THE COURT: Does he waive having that read here in 
2 open court? 
3 MR. MOLGARD: We?ll waive the reading and he intends 
4 to enter a not guilty plea. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Counsel, do we need to 
6 schedule a pretrial conference? Do you anticipate any 
7 motions? 
8 MR, MOLGARD: I anticipate motions. 
9 THE COURT: All right. How much time do you need to 
10 have your motions filed? 
11 MR. MOLGARD: Ifd really like up to about 30 days to 
12 put together a motion on this one and the other felony case. 
13 I think they're kind of complicated motions. I think this 
14 one is a kind of complicated motion to figure out. I 
15 anticipate it will take about 30 days. 
16 MR. BUNDERSON: I donft have any objection to that. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Today's the 17th. Ifll give 
18 you until Friday, February 16th, by five p.m. to file your 
19 motion and memoranda. And then how much time, Mr. Bunderson, 
20 does the state want for a response? 
21 MR. BUNDERSON: Maybe a couple of weeks after that. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Friday, March 2nd, state's 
23 reply will be due. Then let's look at our calendar. Do we 
24 have time March 12th for a hearing? Okay. Three o'clock, 
25 March 12th, for a hearing on the motion. Are we going to 
1 need testimony at that hearing? 
2 MR. BUNDERSON: I wonder if wefll really need an 
3 evidentiary hearing? 
4 MR. MOLGARD: We may or may not. 
5 MR. BUNDERSON: Obviously there's an issue of 
6 exactly how the item was retrieved, but there isn't any 
7 dispute from where it was retrieved. I think the issue may 
8 involve more --
9 MR. MOLGARD: Well, there's a custody --
10 MR. BUNDERSON: The custody status of the defendant, 
11 which seems to be a legal issue. 
12 THE COURT: That's what I'm thinking. But if 
13 there's going to be an issue on the testimony, it would be a 
14 lot easier if you just get the videotape and either of you 
15 make a transcript of that little portion. 
16 MR. MOLGARD: That's what I was thinking. Certainly 
17 the videotape of this, probably. March 12th, what time 
18 again? 
19 THE COURT: Three o'clock. Does that work? 
20 MR. BUNDERSON: It works for us. That's an 
21 evidentiary hearing? 
22 MR. MOLGARD: It seems to me that I was in the 
23 juvenile court this morning and the juvenile court set a 
24 hearing -- no, that was just discussed. Yes, that will work. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Well, we'll reserve enough time 
1 that that could be an evidentiary hearing, but Ifm kind of 
2 hoping you won't need to. 
3 MR. MOLGARD: I agree with you. 
4 MR. BUNDERSON: I agree in the sense I'm not sure 
5 any of the facts are necessarily relevant so much as the 
6 custodial status and what we can do based on that. 
7 THE COURT: Any other issues to address this 
8 afternoon? 
9 MR. BUNDERSON: No. Well, Mr. Collins is to 
10 continue with the conditions of release? 
11 THE COURT: The same conditions. And the other 
12 three accompanying cases are continued to that date as well 
13 MR. BUNDERSON: As long we track together. 
14 THE COURT: We'll notify Mr. Merrell, but I won't 
15 expect him to appear until such time as we actually address 
16 the other cases. 
17 MR. BUNDERSON: In the notice you could suggest he 
18 call me and I could report to him if you would like. 
19 THE COURT: Why don't we do that. 
2 0 MR. MOLGARD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 (Concluded at 4.-45 p.m.) 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 THE CLERK: Case number 0011-553. 
2 THE COURT: I think this is 637, isn't it? 
3 MR. MOLGARD: I believe that — 
4 J MR. BARON: Our response had the wrong number, Your 
5 Honor. 
6 MR. MOLGARD: I think it's 553. 
7 THE COURT: Yes, we have the right case. I was 
8 looking at Mr. Bunderson's response and it does have an 
9 incorrect number on it. 
10 THE CLERK: State of Utah versus Curtis W. Collins. 
11 THE COURT: This is the time scheduled for a hearing 
12 on the defendant's motion to suppress. The court's reviewed 
13 the motion, the memorandum in support and the state's 
14 J response, which was filed just this morning. I'll hear from 
15 you at this time, counsel. 
16 MR. MOLGARD: Yes, Your Honor. As I indicated in my 
17 I memoranda, it's the state's burden to prove an exception to 
18 the warrant requirement and the requirement to in effect have 
19 the court supervise searches. 
20 The state's indicated that it agrees with the facts that 
21 I've set out in my memoranda, including the two police 
22 I reports that were attached to the memoranda. I think it's 
23 J fairly obvious that what happened here was not an arrest. I 
24 would like to point out the statute under which the state — 
25 under which the law enforcement authorities do the transport 
1 in a mental health case. That statute is 62 (a)-12-232. The 
2 reason I didn't argue the arrest business in my memoranda is 
3 because it never occurred to me that anybody might call this 
4 an arrest. I think it stretches credibility to call it an 
5 arrest. We don't agree that it was an arrest. 
6 62 (a)-12-232, specifically paren four, says, 
7 "Transportation of mentally ill persons, pursuant to sections 
8 one and two, shall be conducted by appropriate municipal or 
9 city or town law enforcement authority, or under the 
10 appropriate law enforcement's authority, by ambulance to the 
11 extent that section five applies. However, if the designated 
12 facility is outside the authority's jurisdiction, the 
13 appropriate county sheriff shall transport the person or 
14 cause the person to be transported by ambulance, to the 
15 extent that subsection five applies." Of course, apparently 
16 subsection five applied because they did transport Mr. 
17 Collins by ambulance. 
18 But the original -- I don't think that contemplates that 
19 it's an arrest. I think if it does it creates a flock of 
20 problems. Just as an example, I think if it's an arrest, a 
21 law enforcement authority cannot do it unless there's a 
22 warrant. There's no warrant in this case. The basis for 
23 that is 77-7, I think. 
24 THE COURT: I think normally we refer to it as a 
25 civil commitment, wouldn't we? 
1 MR. MOLGARD: Yeah, that's what it is, is a civil 
2 J commitment. 11-1-2, an arrest by a peace officer requires 
3 that there be a warrant except for public offenses committed 
4 I or attempted in the presence the peace officer, et cetera. 
5 I think itfs obvious that if the Brigham City police, or 
6 for that matter the county sheriff, arrested this gentleman, 
7 that it was without a warrant and there was no public offense 
8 committed, period. It wasn't a public offense, it was a 
9 civil commitment. They had the obligation to transport, I 
10 I agree with that. 
11 THE COURT: I follow your argument. Let me ask you 
12 a follow up question. Sometimes you advise local government 
13 in other capacities. If that's not an arrest, but simply a 
14 J civil commitment, but statutorily the sheriff's deputies are 
15 required to make that transport, when they deliver this 
16 person who by, definition, may be uncooperative. I mean, 
17 that's the nature of an involuntary commitment is that 
18 sometimes they're passive, sometimes they're not at all 
19 passive. Are you suggesting that when they deliver "them to 
20 the facility, such as the state hospital or any hospital, 
21 that they basically stand back and say we need a nurse here 
22 to look for weapons, we can't do that? 
23 MR. MOLGARD: I buy — yes, I might well say that, 
24 except that that doesn't apply in this case. 
25 THE COURT: I'm talking about in the bigger picture 
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in another case. 
MR. MOLGARD: Even in the bigger picture 
wouldn't apply. 
THE COURT: Who would look for weapons? 
MR. MOLGARD: If you'll let me explain. 
City police look fo 
from the Bear River 
r the weapons. When they took 
Mental Health to the Brigham 
emergency room initially, they looked for weapons 
a search. That's p 
did a search. 
THE COURT: 
art of the facts. The Brigham 
Did they have authority for 
MR. MOLGARD: I think — I'm not sure th 
authority for that 
questioning here. 
search. I suppose 
the theories of the 
Initially they have 
to see that there's 
circumstances that 
search, but that's not what IM 
it normally 
The Brigham 
Mr. Collins 
City 
They did 
City police 
that search? 
ey did have 
Tl 
I'm not questioning that particular 
that they have authority maybe 
Terry stop and the Terry cust< 
based on 
Ddy things. 
a right to see that there's no weapons, 
no danger. That may be the exigent 
allows that to do it initially 
happened here. I don't have any particular probl< 
that. 
But then, after 
arrest, which I don 
point of the arrest 
search incident to 
that took place -- and if the. 
rt believe there was, but that 
, the Brigham City police. If 
And that 
am with 
re was an 
was the 
there was a 
an arrest that would have had to be it. 
1 The search — and then the sheriff!s department gets involved 
2 and the ambulance crew takes him to Logan and delivers him to 
3 the mental health unit. 
4 Now, what I would say there is the mental health unit has 
5 an obligation to do the search if there's one to be done at 
6 that point. How they handle it they probably know. They may 
7 have a procedure for doing it. There's no evidence before 
8 this court that there's any procedures for the ambulance crew 
9 or anyone else to do that. That leaves it wide open. Even 
10 in the case of an inventory of an automobile, it has to be 
11 done pursuant to procedures, a written procedure, according 
12 to the Utah Supreme Court. But they probably have the 
13 obligation to do it. If we were really concerned about 
14 weapons, why not search at the beginning of the transport 
15 rather than the end of the transport? That's the trouble 
16 with that. 
17 In this particular instance the Brigham City police did 
18 do a search, probably for weapons, and didn't find anything. 
19 And then after he was delivered to the mental health unit and 
20 was not really in the custody of the police anymore, for 
21 transport or otherwise, then they do the search. And even if 
22 they do the search at that point they were looking for 
23 weapons, but you know what? There were really two searches 
24 made there. There was the search by Lynn Yeates to take his 
25 wallet out of his pocket and to take the knife sheath. There 
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was no indication in either instance that either one of those 
things were weapons, none at all. 
And then he gives it to the sheriff's deputy who was 
along to, I suppose, assist if Mr. Collins became violent, 
which he was heavily sedated. That's part of the evidence 
too. And then she searched the two items and she's the one 
that found the contraband. 
So, you know, it's really a step away from the whole 
process, really. It seems to me it's exactly what the 
unreasonable search and seizure thing was intended to 
prevent. Mr. Collins was in the custody of the — on the 
civil commitment he was in the custody of the mental health 
unit in Logan at the time because that's where he'd been 
delivered to. It wasn't a search for weapons at all, it was 
a search for contraband. That's obviously what it was 
because they didn't try to — because neither one of those 
items had any indices of weapons. It just wasn't there. 
Of course, it seems to me the only thing the state argues 
in their memoranda is that there was a search incident to an 
arrest. I don't believe it was an arrest. I believe that 
clearly the statute that allows transport makes it not an 
arrest. It's a civil commitment. 
If it was an arrest the Brigham City police department 
was the ones that made the arrest. The search incident to 
the arrest would have been required to be done fairly close. 
1 In fact, there's a Supreme Court case that -- a U.S. Supreme 
2 I Court case that basically says it has to be contemporaneous 
3 with the arrest, which clearly it wasn't here. And the 
4 arresting agency was the Brigham City police department, not 
5 Deputy Baty, who made the search later. And Deputy Yeates 
6 who made the search later. 
7 And even if it was incident to an arrest, the arrest was 
8 an illegal arrest because the statute requires that there be 
9 a warrant unless those specific conditions are met. So it 
10 just seems to me it's obviously not justified by incident to 
11 an arrest. 
12 If in fact it's not justified incident to an arrest, we 
13 need to identify, if we're going to allow it in, a specific 
14 exception, one of those well delineated exceptions. I 
15 challenge anybody to show me any case law that shows me any 
16 J of those well delineated exceptions here. It just doesn't 
17 fit any of them that I know. 
18 Now, I apologize to say I challenge. Maybe you'll think 
19 of one right quickly. If you do, fine. I would really like 
20 to have a chance to respond to it, but I don't see any. 
21 Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Baron. 
23 MR. BARON: Just briefly, Your Honor. I think 
24 mainly what we're arguing about is semantics. You look at 
25 counsel's exhibit A and it says that a peace officer --
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authorizes a peace officer to ta 
custody. Specifically under the 
his exhibit A, custody. 
Now, Mr. Molgard says that's 
is the functional equivalent of 
really need to quibble about whe 
arrest or custody or if custody 
a crime or not a crime. 
ke a proposed patient into 
instructions that's part of 
not an arrest, but it really 
an arrest. I don't think we 
ther it's technically an 
is an arrest whether it's for 
Really, the concerns are exactly the same. When you 
arrest someone what are your concerns? That they may have a 
weapon and, secondly, that they i may have something valuable 
on their person that they're going to claim the officer 
stole. Normally you arrest them 
you do a booking process where a 
performed. You look in their wa 
money, so on. 
We have the exact functional 
was taken into, quote, custody. 
and transported. The functional 
would assert that really it is a 
happened at that point, although 
civil arrest. 
And then instead of taking h 
I him to the hospital. But once a 
equivalent. You're taking the p< 
, take them to the jail, then 
more thorough"search is 
llet, check the amount of 
equivalent here. The person 
He was actually handcuffed 
equivalent to an arrest. I 
common law arrest, is what 
not for a crime, more of a 
im to the sheriff they took 
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arson to somewhere where 
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they're going to be housed, where they're going to be 
staying. You need to make sure there's nothing they can 
hurts themselves with, hurt someone else with, plus see if 
they've got any great amounts of money, so on. Just like the 
booking process. It's the same thing. 
What the constitution forbids is unreasonable searches 
and seizures. I would submit, Your Honor, that under these 
circumstances it's the same thing functionally as an arrest 
and booking. It's not unreasonable. It is reasonable. And 
really it was an arrest in every sense of 'the word, other 
than there was no beginning crime. Instead of a crime we 
have a statutory commitment under which the defendant was 
arrested and transported to the facility under the statute. 
So I think it was a reasonable search and should not be 
suppressed. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'm going to take this under 
advisement. I'd to --- I'm taking too much credit when I say 
I'd like to do some research. I never get time to do any 
research. I have someone who will help me do some research. 
The fact scenario doesn't seem to be that unusual. When 
I say that, I mean this can't be the first time in the United 
States that this type of an occurrence happened. People are 
taken into custody on civil commitments quite frequently. 
Surely there's been other cases where in the process of 
taking that person into custody and delivering them to a 
1 mental health facility either weapons or contraband or 
2 something was discovered. 
3 Nothing is coming to mind, I'm not aware of a case, but I 
4 think Ifd like to have some research done and find out which 
5 way that has gone possibly in other jurisdictions. So Ifll 
6 try and get you a written decision in about two weeks. 
7 Anything else? 
8 MR. MOLGARD: Well, Your Honor, Ifve looked and I 
9 didn't see anything in regard to that. I might indicate that 
10 I don't agree with Mr. Baron's analysis of the functional 
11 equivalent thing. I think that if you deliver somebody to a 
12 jail it isn't the arresting officer who does the search 
13 there, it's the booking officer. That's not incident to an 
14 arrest, that's some other — that's another exception. In 
15 this particular instance, if that's the case, you deliver it 
16 to the mental health unit and then the mental health unit 
17 does the search, I suppose, if you're talking about that. 
18 Certainly it's not incident to an arrest. 
19 THE COURT: I'll try and have a decision out to you 
20 in a couple of weeks. Hopefully we can find some authority 
21 that's on point. 
22 MR. BARON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 MR. MOLGARD: Do you want to wait to set that other 
24 ohe Uhtil We $et thfe dgdisioh 6tt this bfte? 
25 MR. BARON: That's fine with me. 
1 THE COURT: Let's see. The other one was going to 
2 require evidence, wasn't it? 
3 MR. MOLGARD: Yeah. And I want to get the 
4 transcript of the preliminary hearing if we're going to — 
5 THE COURT: Maybe we ought to set that. This one 
6 won't dispose of that either way? Regardless of what I do 
7 here, that one will need a hearing. Maybe we ought to go 
8 ahead and schedule it. 30 minutes, an hour? How much time 
9 do you expect? 
10 MR. BARON: I'm guessing we better plan on an hour, 
11 Your Honor, 
2 (Pause in the proceedings 
3 THE COURT: Counsel, how about the afternoon of 
4 April 25th? We can take the first hour there, 1:30 to 2:30. 
5 MR. BARON: That will be fine, Your Honor, 
6 MR. MOLGARD: That will work, 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Let's plan on that. I'll have a 
8 decision out on this one before that date 
9 I MR. MOLGARD: Thank you, Your Honor, 
0 
1 | (Concluded at 3:15 p.m. 
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